As a matter of pure logic, there is no problem of evil.

[Myriad88]

No it's not about allowing it, you've lost me a bit here brah.

This is just about whether you think that somebody who you perceive as having evil intentions can then ever have those evil intentions justified through you creating and attributing more morally righteous and benevolent intentions on top of them of which override what you initially perceived as being evil intentions so that the person seems more justified in doing what they do.

To try to clarify a bit more: If you perceive somebody as deliberately killing another person, could it be the case that rather than that persons intentions being purely evil in nature, that it could be that there is a greater and more morally justified intention that they're following in committing that murder. That they are acting with a morally sufficient reason?

thats what im arguing, in this case 'allowing to happen' rather than perform act oneself.

see my earlier example about seeing someone preach hate speech on the sidewalk. It could be seen as evil, indifferent, callous etc by not doing anything, but a moral imperative overrides any lower level, personal motive to silence him-respecting his right to freedom of speech.

[GregariousWolf]

Good morning sawoobly, I want to thank you for your detailed reply. Didn't have an opportunity to answer the whole thing yesterday.

God's intelligence is perfect and his character is holy but he knew that his creations/children would not have this perfect and hold character.

...

Our inability to logically justify the problem of evil does not equate to their not being a God. What you can say, IMO, is that based on this or that argument the problem of evil makes the probability of your God being who he says he is impossible according you your own doctrine or something of that nature.

I find a contradiction in the idea of a perfect deity making a flawed creation.

I believe a lot of apologetics is about defending this contradiction and trying to justify why a deity who is all-seeing, all-powerful, and all-loving would create a world filled with agony, suffering, and grief.

In this thread I have not been arguing strongly against theism as much. (Though I have a little.)

What I have been arguing is that all of the doctrine surrounding what we think God or gods might be are very likely wrong. Apologetics and doctrine (in my opinion of course) seem to be centered around justifying the immoral, callous, and cruel acts of a supposedly loving deity. I have not been pressing any case against some kind of first cause or deistic creator who put the universe into motion. I have been centering on our ideas characterizing god and how they are likely wrong.

I'm off the reservation compared to the majority of Christians on this point. I've realized this recently through these discussions.

While I do hold that God is all powerful, all-knowing and omnipresent my definition of these are different than most. I do not hold that God created us absolutely (or out of nothing) but rather he "organized" us from existing matter and intelligence already present in the universe. (Somewhat related to this but not exactly - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/reli...-academic.html)

So, God deals with us on our own terms since we are in part the product of our raw materials. God molds us into something much greater than what we were initially created to be through his grace and guidance. As for evil, I've thought about this a lot and I don't really have an explanation for evil. I suppose evil has always existed. In a way I think evil is probably somewhat related to chaos and disobedience to God's commands. In my view there seems to be something inherent in most of us that causes us to want to rebel against God and do our own thing. Anything that leads us away from God is in a sense evil because God is completely good and we are totally reliant upon him for salvation. An analogy to this are things that would lead a wayward teenage child away from his loving parents into destructive behaviors that ultimately harm the child and make him/her miserable.

Why did God send a tsunami do destroy Banda Aceh province in Indonesia in 2004?

I find the idea of a omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent deity justifying death and destruction as part of the greater good and part of the mysterious plan as just making an excuse.

Another option is that God is capricious and cruel. The angry deity of the ancient Hebrews is still with us, sending meteor strikes and earthquakes. I reject this as well.

What I think is going on is the universe is not controlled by a conscious will. The doctrine that answers the question of evil is making excuses for a god that doesn't exist.

[sawoobley]

Good morning sawoobly, I want to thank you for your detailed reply. Didn't have an opportunity to answer the whole thing yesterday.
I find a contradiction in the idea of a perfect deity making a flawed creation.
I believe a lot of apologetics is about defending this contradiction and trying to justify why a deity who is all-seeing, all-powerful, and all-loving would create a world filled with agony, suffering, and grief.
In this thread I have not been arguing strongly against theism as much. (Though I have a little.)

What I have been arguing is that all of the doctrine surrounding what we think God or gods might be are very likely wrong. Apologetics and doctrine (in my opinion of course) seem to be centered around justifying the immoral, callous, and cruel acts of a supposedly loving deity. I have not been pressing any case against some kind of first cause or deistic creator who put the universe into motion. I have been centering on our ideas characterizing god and how they are likely wrong.

God did not make a flawed creation. The earth and the first man and woman were created in a perfect near blissful state. It was Adam and Eve's transgression in the Garden of Eden that brought about the fall. The effect of this was a physical change upon the earth and the introduction of evil and death into the world. It was the vehicle God used to bring about the flawed world where we could learn good from evil and have children of our own. With agony, suffering and grief there is also happiness, joy and peace. Both need to be experienced to understand the other.

Why did God send a tsunami do destroy Banda Aceh province in Indonesia in 2004?

I find the idea of a omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent deity justifying death and destruction as part of the greater good and part of the mysterious plan as just making an excuse.

Another option is that God is capricious and cruel. The angry deity of the ancient Hebrews is still with us, sending meteor strikes and earthquakes. I reject this as well.

What I think is going on is the universe is not controlled by a conscious will. The doctrine that answers the question of evil is making excuses for a god that doesn't exist.


I don't think God sent a tsunami to Indonesia in 2004. Even if he did it wouldn't matter. God looks at death much differently than we do. If he were to send a tsunami somewhere he would have a purpose in doing so and he would have made arrangements beforehand on what to do with the souls that lost their lives afterwards. This life isn't all there is and our learning and instruction continue into the next life where we don't have to experience pain and suffering to the same degree as we do here.

...

[YuMadThough]

thats what im arguing, in this case 'allowing to happen' rather than perform act oneself.

see my earlier example about seeing someone preach hate speech on the sidewalk. It could be seen as evil, indifferent, callous etc by not doing anything, but a moral imperative overrides any lower level, personal motive to silence him-respecting his right to freedom of speech.

I interpret this as prioritizing an act that a person ought to be able to do, over and above an act that a person is doing, but without really addressing anything to do with the 'intention' bit of the other person. It could still be the case here that you could still view the preacher as inherently evil or as having evil intentions but are just personally not acting to do anything about it due to deeming the ability to speak freely as more important.

It might be that I'm wrongly assuming that we're using the same kind of moral framework when it might not be the case, so just a few quick questions I'd like to put to you first to clear up any misunderstandings on my part if you don't mind answering them:

* Do you agree that people themselves as individuals can be considered to be evil; that evil people can be said to exist?
* Do you agree that viewing a person as evil can be distinctly different from viewing a specific act as being evil?
* Do you think that a person can ever be considered to have evil intentions before an evil act is committed by them?
* When you judge what is evil, do you judge it purely on the favourableness of an actual outcome as opposed to any intended outcome? (A good example here being your previous example of a man shooting at random and because of the fact that he shot a terrorist then he can rightfully be considered good and not evil)
* Finally: If a man traveling in Africa encourages a friend to swim in a pond after seeing other tourists having fun there, would you say that he is to blame for that friend being bitten by a mosquito and contracting malaria?

Not trying to put you on the spot or anything here though and you don't have to answer, just trying to get a better perspective of where we're both at.

[DubstepDealer]

Now, you are playing psychology.

[sy2502]

Do you mean something like, I shoot a man on the street, therefore I am evil. Upon closer examination, he has c4 strapped to his chest and was about to detonate it inside a busy office building. Therefore, I had a morally sufficient reason for my act of evil?

The problem with your example is that you are not god. An omnipotent god would be able to stop the suicide bomber without need to kill him. He'd just poof the bomb out of existence or something. The human examples are flawed because we HAVE to choose the "lesser evil". An omnipotent god doesn't.

[Queequeg]

God would not intervene to stop evil if it were to prevent a greater good (in the long run).

Those "acts of God" are almost always the result of natural phenomenon. While God has the power to control the weather he doesn't usually control the wind and ocean currents beyond the natural laws he set up when he created the earth. We were put on this earth to act and be acted upon. Sometimes that means being in the wrong place at the wrong time. God does have a foreknowledge of all these things and how he works out every little detail isn't clear. I'm not sure if he thought through every possible scenario before he put us all here or if he allows some kind of adjustments and back-up plans to occur.

Again this means gods actions would be contigent on certain conditions, and thus limited

Freewill and greater good aside.. God creates everything, good and evil are just human perspectives of events, [babies burning in the forest for no reason is neither good nor evil from a strictly objective standpoint] God can do all the "evil" he wants, even without any justification/greater good, and still be God, because God has no judges <----- What's the flaw in this reasoning?

None, but that is not a loving god

[YuMadThough]

Disregard the questions in my previous post OP, I think I do understand where you're coming from now after re-reading your posts.

In which case I'll just leave this:

Either a beings intentions are what defines that being as being considered to be benevolent/evil.
Or
Contextual situations are what defines a being as being considered to be benevolent/evil.

If intentions define a beings moral character (benevolent/evil), then god can be said to be a benevolent being who intends good things, but only in the case that his intending to allow evil can be overridden by a more benevolent intention. This is where my argument comes in that if you can personally reason that god has a more benevolent intention for allowing bad things to happen, then you should also be able to personally reason that people who are often considered to be evil for intending to do bad things, can also have their bad intentions overridden by more benevolent intentions so that they too can be viewed as being benevolent beings. In which case every single being can potentially be viewed as being benevolent which contrasts with the concept of evil.

However if contextual situations are what defines a beings moral character (benevolent/evil), then it means that contextual situations are what defines gods character, and if contextual situations defines gods character rather than his intent, then he cannot be considered to be an omnibenevolent being or even omnipotent since contextual situations would presumably have to be acting outside of his intent and control in order for you to form that judgement of whether he's a benevolent being or not.

[GoJu]

This is for atheists. I'm interested as to why you believe the existence of evil is a logical defeater of theism.

The way I've traditionally encountered it is in this binary logic form, whereby it utilises the law of non-contradiction (Two opposing statements cannot both be true,or false, and if one is true, the other is necessarily false).

P1-If evil exists, God does not exist

P2-Evil exists

C-Therefore God does not exist

The argument is essentially relying on the corollary of binary logic, that two possibilities between them are occupying all the logical space and the demonstrable truth of one, by fiat, falsifies the other.

However with any binary logic scenario, it must be an impossibility to further subdivide the logical space. If any further subdivision of the logical territory is even a mere possibility, the argument is negated.

For this supposed logical problem of evil, I believe we can demonstrate this scenario is not one constrained by binary logic, if there is a third option which of itself, is not a logical impossibility. For example, it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting the existence of evil. Now whether this is actually true is of course, open to argument/counter argument, but the mere fact one can introduce it as a logical possibility negates the original syllogism predicated on binary logic.

It seems the atheist goes on to appeal to the extremes of evil, or the sheer degree of some evil-say, third world countries, starvation, dying babies and so on and so forth. However this feels to me like emotivism-one is expressing personal disgust, rather than formulating a logically ironclad syllogism.

The problem of evil doesn't disprove the existence of god, it disproves the morality of god.

God could exist and be immoral or amoral.

[lasher]

The problem of evil doesn't disprove the existence of god, it disproves the morality of god.

God could exist and be immoral or amoral.

It doesn't disprove anything. At best it makes an argument (not proof, argument) for either the non existence or immorality of God, but no more than that.

[sawoobley]

Again this means gods actions would be contigent on certain conditions, and thus limited

His actions are dependent on what he wants to do. He is not limited. He acts when and how he wants to act for his own purposes.

If intentions define a beings moral character (benevolent/evil), then god can be said to be a benevolent being who intends good things, but only in the case that his intending to allow evil can be overridden by a more benevolent intention. This is where my argument comes in that if you can personally reason that god has a more benevolent intention for allowing bad things to happen, then you should also be able to personally reason that people who are often considered to be evil for intending to do bad things, can also have their bad intentions overridden by more benevolent intentions so that they too can be viewed as being benevolent beings. In which case every single being can potentially be viewed as being benevolent which contrasts with the concept of evil.

However if contextual situations are what defines a beings moral character (benevolent/evil), then it means that contextual situations are what defines gods character, and if contextual situations defines gods character rather than his intent, then he cannot be considered to be an omnibenevolent being or even omnipotent since contextual situations would presumably have to be acting outside of his intent and control in order for you to form that judgement of whether he's a benevolent being or not.

You cannot make the comparison between God and man. God's good intentions ultimately lead to the desired outcome since he has all power, knowledge and knows the future. Intentions are not the only thing that determine if someone is good. Results matter also.

What do you mean by contextual situations?

[GoJu]

It doesn't disprove anything. At best it makes an argument (not proof, argument) for either the non existence or immorality of God, but no more than that.

Ahhhh, long time no see son.

[lasher]

Ahhhh, long time no see son.

What's up broski.

That quote from stizzel is funny as hell if legit.



Back on topic, I'd clarify to say that it does make the best argument (imo) against God's existence/God's morality, just not anything near a formal proof or an actual contradiction.

[GoJu]

What's up broski.

That quote from stizzel is funny as hell if legit.



Back on topic, I'd clarify to say that it does make the best argument (imo) against God's existence/God's morality, just not anything near a formal proof or an actual contradiction.

Busy as fuark with engineering senior project but it's coming along slowly.

It's legit, there was a whole thread where he defended the idea.

I don't think the problem of evil does anything in terms of disproving god's existence, I don't know why people use it in an attempt to do that.

Yeah that's fine, it's probably not a full blown proof but it definitely puts kinks in the absolute morality armor that god's usually dressed up in IMO.

[Myriad88]

The problem of evil doesn't disprove the existence of god, it disproves the morality of god.

God could exist and be immoral or amoral.

did you miss the whole point of the OP? The point of the OP demonstrates the logic behind that argument which purportedly "disproves" a moral God is at core, totally fallacious.

Just follow the logic of it brah

[GoJu]

did you miss the whole point of the OP? The point of the OP demonstrates the logic behind that argument which purportedly "disproves" a moral God is at core, totally fallacious.

Just follow the logic of it brah

The 'logic' of the OP is sorely wanting.

Free will is not god's get out of jail free card.

There are no morally sufficient reasons to allow things like the holocaust.

The free will of evil people is being honored over the free will of good people in such instances.

This is why your god is not worth worshiping even if he does exist.

[Myriad88]

The 'logic' of the OP is sorely wanting.

Free will is not god's get out of jail free card.

There are no morally sufficient reasons to allow things like the holocaust.

The free will of evil people is being honored over the free will of good people in such instances.

This is why your god is not worth worshiping even if he does exist.

^^^^ does not grasp the OP.


The OP is dealing with the logical scaffolding of the problem of evil. Binary logic, no possible 'third option'. Even a logical possibility is not an option if the problem of evil is sound.

All I need to do is introduce the logical possibility of a third option and the binary logic collapses-God exists, and evil exists can both be true.


Calling into question the veracity of this third option, is another argument altogether.

[GoJu]

^^^^ does not grasp the OP.


The OP is dealing with the logical scaffolding of the problem of evil. Binary logic, no possible 'third option'. Even a logical possibility is not an option if the problem of evil is sound.

All I need to do is introduce the logical possibility of a third option and the binary logic collapses-God exists, and evil exists can both be true.


Calling into question the veracity of this third option, is another argument altogether.

^^^^^^Not grasping my argument.

I did grasp the option, I used to think like you when I was a theist.

I never said God can't exist if evil exists. God can exists and there can still be evil. God can exist and he can be evil (or just not have morals, what use does a perfect being have for morality?)

[Queequeg]

His actions are dependent on what he wants to do. He is not limited. He acts when and how he wants to act for his own purposes

Wanting to permit evil is different from needing to permit evil. The latter was the original apology

[sy2502]

Disregard the questions in my previous post OP, I think I do understand where you're coming from now after re-reading your posts.

In which case I'll just leave this:

Either a beings intentions are what defines that being as being considered to be benevolent/evil.
Or
Contextual situations are what defines a being as being considered to be benevolent/evil.

If intentions define a beings moral character (benevolent/evil), then god can be said to be a benevolent being who intends good things, but only in the case that his intending to allow evil can be overridden by a more benevolent intention. This is where my argument comes in that if you can personally reason that god has a more benevolent intention for allowing bad things to happen, then you should also be able to personally reason that people who are often considered to be evil for intending to do bad things, can also have their bad intentions overridden by more benevolent intentions so that they too can be viewed as being benevolent beings. In which case every single being can potentially be viewed as being benevolent which contrasts with the concept of evil.

However if contextual situations are what defines a beings moral character (benevolent/evil), then it means that contextual situations are what defines gods character, and if contextual situations defines gods character rather than his intent, then he cannot be considered to be an omnibenevolent being or even omnipotent since contextual situations would presumably have to be acting outside of his intent and control in order for you to form that judgement of whether he's a benevolent being or not.

God is supposedly omnipotent. Nothing prevents his intentions to become actions other than his own will.

[YuMadThough]

You cannot make the comparison between God and man. God's good intentions ultimately lead to the desired outcome since he has all power, knowledge and knows the future. Intentions are not the only thing that determine if someone is good. Results matter also.

What do you mean by contextual situations?

God is supposedly omnipotent. Nothing prevents his intentions to become actions other than his own will.

It's specifically about the reasoning process that's used to justify gods allowance of evil more than anything. You would first though have to be accepting of the notion that the reasoning away of what can be seen as gods bad intention (the allowance of evil), through the creation of more supposed benevolent intentions that overrides that one, is in itself subjectively derived by yourself (or whoever happens to reason it). If you can agree with this then you could also agree that the reasoning process that enabled you to do that could also be applied to people, that for example; for somebody who you think intended to murder an innocent person, that it could be reasoned that that person actually intended to murder with a much more benevolent intention in mind thus making that person seem like a more benevolent person. The form of reasoning can be applied to both god and to people so there's no basis that I can see on which the reasoning for god deserves any exceptional privilege.

For the point on defining benevolence: normally when somebody ascribes moral character such as describing a being as benevolent (god), they're doing so on the assumption that he is responsible for good things happening by acting deliberately through good intentions. It's often assumed that the good intentions are the prime mover for good things happening. That a good intention precedes a good outcome is the basis upon which you feel justified in affirming that the being has a benevolent moral character, a 'good god' etc. This is one way of attributing moral character.

The alternative way is what I mean by the 'contextual situations' approach. It's just a different style of attributing a beings moral character to that of what's often employed above. In this instance, rather than viewing a good intent preceding a good outcome as being the basis of justification for a good moral character, this would instead be taking a certain situation or outcome, such as one person killing a criminal, and then taking the feelings that you would have towards that particular situation or outcome (someone killing a criminal - which you view as 'good'), causally determining the being that can be said to be most responsible for it's occurrence (the killer), and then attributing those feelings that you have towards the situation/outcome itself, to the moral character of that person viewed to be responsible for bringing it about. In effect you're brushing aside the relationship between the intent of the person deemed to be responsible for the situation; to that of its causing the outcome, as the primary means of justification for coming to a judgement about a beings moral character.

[sy2502]

It's specifically about the reasoning process that's used to justify gods allowance of evil more than anything. You would first though have to be accepting of the notion that the reasoning away of what can be seen as gods bad intention (the allowance of evil), through the creation of more supposed benevolent intentions that overrides that one, is in itself subjectively derived by yourself (or whoever happens to reason it). If you can agree with this then you could also agree that the reasoning process that enabled you to do that could also be applied to people, that for example; for somebody who you think intended to murder an innocent person, that it could be reasoned that that person actually intended to murder with a much more benevolent intention in mind thus making that person seem like a more benevolent person. The form of reasoning can be applied to both god and to people so there's no basis that I can see on which the reasoning for god deserves any exceptional privilege.

If I understand you correctly, and please correct me if I don't, you are applying a variant of the "god's divine plan" argument. That is, as long as god does or allows what seems like evil for a higher purpose, then that evil isn't evil any more. Again I have to point out that this reasoning doesn't keep in mind god is all-good. If he allowed or did some evil, even the lesser of 2 evils, or evil for a good cause, he'd still be doing evil. So he wouldn't be all-good, he'd be pretty-good. Also, god is omnipotent, he can have his cake and eat it too. He doesn't need to do an evil act for a good goal, he can get that goal in another way that doesn't include the evil act.

For the point on defining benevolence: normally when somebody ascribes moral character such as describing a being as benevolent (god), they're doing so on the assumption that he is responsible for good things happening by acting deliberately through good intentions. It's often assumed that the good intentions are the prime mover for good things happening. That a good intention precedes a good outcome is the basis upon which you feel justified in affirming that the being has a benevolent moral character, a 'good god' etc. This is one way of attributing moral character.

This only applies to limited human beings. If I see a child suffocating, and I do a blotched tracheotomy job to help him, then yes, my intentions were good, I did what I could, it wasn't very good, but give me a break. But god can put his perfect intentions into perfect actions. He doesn't "do his best", he is supposed to do the best possible. So in his case, since his actions aren't limited by anything other than his intentions, his actions and his intentions coincide.

[sawoobley]

You would first though have to be accepting of the notion that the reasoning away of what can be seen as gods bad intention (the allowance of evil), through the creation of more supposed benevolent intentions that overrides that one, is in itself subjectively derived by yourself (or whoever happens to reason it). If you can agree with this then you could also agree that the reasoning process that enabled you to do that could also be applied to people, that for example; for somebody who you think intended to murder an innocent person, that it could be reasoned that that person actually intended to murder with a much more benevolent intention in mind thus making that person seem like a more benevolent person. The form of reasoning can be applied to both god and to people so there's no basis that I can see on which the reasoning for god deserves any exceptional privilege.

You cannot compare God and man directly. First, I am describing the true nature of God and not just how I perceive him. There have been men (prophets) who God has revealed himself to more intimately and they came to the same conclusion that God is good. The assumption is that if God revealed all things to us then we could know more perfectly how good he is. God is infinite and eternal. It is impossible to understand him fully and his reasons for doing things since he sees and knows things we could never know with our limited minds and worldview. We have to use the available evidence and reasoning to believe that God is actually good. The rest we can accept on faith.

When it comes to other human beings we can comprehend the intent and actions of others. If their actions are outside of our laws then it does not matter what their intentions are. Humans do not have the right to play God and pretend to have a higher purpose for their actions when they directly infringe on the God given rights of others. In the case of self-defense they are defending their own right to life.

...

[sy2502]

There have been men (prophets) who God has revealed himself to more intimately and they came to the same conclusion that God is good. The assumption is that if God revealed all things to us then we could know more perfectly how good he is. God is infinite and eternal. It is impossible to understand him fully and his reasons for doing things since he sees and knows things we could never know with our limited minds and worldview. We have to use the available evidence and reasoning to believe that God is actually good. The rest we can accept on faith.

If "good" is impossible for us to understand, then god isn't all-good. He's all-"something". When people have a discussion, they obviously use terms that they can understand and relate to. If "good" is a human term, and god is something else, then god isn't good. Again, sorry but the Problem of Evil argument is that good for a reason. It really does cover all basis.

[YuMadThough]

If I understand you correctly, and please correct me if I don't, you are applying a variant of the "god's divine plan" argument. That is, as long as god does or allows what seems like evil for a higher purpose, then that evil isn't evil any more. Again I have to point out that this reasoning doesn't keep in mind god is all-good.

Yes but I am not so much applying it myself here, this is just what I'm assuming needs to be reasoned in order to justify gods perfect moral character and in which case I'm then saying that for whoever does reason like this, that the exact same kind of reasoning can also apply to normal people to also excuse their acts of 'evil' and their perceived 'evil' intents.

I would definitely agree with your point though, somebody who uses this reasoning must do so on the basis of initially dismissing the view of god as being all-good. It is reasoning in an attempt to justify gods moral character based on the acceptance of the apparent existence of evil in the world and the acceptance of this evil arising through gods intentions. So to even employ this reasoning in the first place is acknowledgement that doing so does in itself contradicts the view of god as being all-good. I'm not sure if this is how you meant it but it does make good point lol.

This aside though, if it were to be accepted that he is all-good (always does good acts through good intent) so as to discredit the need for this type of reasoning, then how do you reconcile him being all-good with evil things happening in the world which are assumedly arising through his intentions?

If he allowed or did some evil, even the lesser of 2 evils, or evil for a good cause, he'd still be doing evil. So he wouldn't be all-good, he'd be pretty-good. Also, god is omnipotent, he can have his cake and eat it too. He doesn't need to do an evil act for a good goal, he can get that goal in another way that doesn't include the evil act.

Agree with this first part too, this is why if you're unable to change your perspective of evil actions or events to that of not being evil through the reasoning that god has more benovolent intentions for doing/allowing those 'evil' things, then it's the case that evil things can be said to happen and that assumedly they arise from gods evil intentions which means that god cannot be all-good, that he isn't omnibenevolent.
For the assuming omnipotence: why then would he do/allow evil if his true goal for doing/allowing that evil could easily be fulfilled in another way that doesn't require the doing or allowance of evil things?

This only applies to limited human beings. If I see a child suffocating, and I do a blotched tracheotomy job to help him, then yes, my intentions were good, I did what I could, it wasn't very good, but give me a break. But god can put his perfect intentions into perfect actions. He doesn't "do his best", he is supposed to do the best possible. So in his case, since his actions aren't limited by anything other than his intentions, his actions and his intentions coincide.

Do you mean this in the sense that the ascribing of a beings moral character only applies to limited humans?

You cannot compare God and man directly. First, I am describing the true nature of God and not just how I perceive him. There have been men (prophets) who God has revealed himself to more intimately and they came to the same conclusion that God is good. The assumption is that if God revealed all things to us then we could know more perfectly how good he is. God is infinite and eternal. It is impossible to understand him fully and his reasons for doing things since he sees and knows things we could never know with our limited minds and worldview. We have to use the available evidence and reasoning to believe that God is actually good. The rest we can accept on faith.

I'm not so sure what I'm saying here will be of much relevance for you in this instance then.
The point I'm raising mainly only applies to the reasoning process that's used to reach a particular judgement about god and so without acknowledging that that reasoning process is itself subjective and then placing it into a kind of 'mental spotlight' so to speak for scrutiny, then I think we just will never see eye-to-eye on this.

I do want to ask though that if it's impossible to comprehend the intentions of god, how then can you think that he has a benevolent moral character? If it's the case that you can only base his moral character on assumptions, then how can you be sure that those assumptions are true and that it's not a case of something similar to that of a woman idolizing her husband and assuming that he's a good person with good intentions, eventhough really this isn't the case and that he regularly beats her with a belt buckle just for fun every weekend? How can you be sure you're not akin to the wife and are being duped by your own faulty assumptions of another beings good intent?

[sy2502]

Do you mean this in the sense that the ascribing of a beings moral character only applies to limited humans?

For people, we consider the intention in addition to the actual action because being limited in power and knowledge, our actions don't always achieve our intentions. We used this in the judicial system too, when we discriminate between accidental killing and intentional murder. This cannot apply to god because he doesn't have the excuse of not knowing something, or not having the power to do something, or doing anything accidentally. Therefore good intentions can't be used to mitigate god's evil deeds.

Other examples people bring up are that if a kid is sick, he may have to go through painful surgery to get better, and therefore inflicting that surgery isn't evil. That's only valid if we don't know of any other way of making that kid better other than the painful surgery. But now imagine if the doctor had anesthetic but decided to operate the kid live. He's curing the kid, but the suffering isn't necessary any more, just cruel. The end doesn't justify the means any more. God is omnipotent therefore he can get whatever good outcome he wants without suffering. Every suffering god inflicts is by definition unnecessary because he's omnipotent.

So the answer to your question is that IMO we can ascribe moral character to both people and god, but that the mitigating circumstances that apply to people cannot apply to god.

[YuMadThough]

For people, we consider the intention in addition to the actual action because being limited in power and knowledge, our actions don't always achieve our intentions. We used this in the judicial system too, when we discriminate between accidental killing and intentional murder. This cannot apply to god because he doesn't have the excuse of not knowing something, or not having the power to do something, or doing anything accidentally. Therefore good intentions can't be used to mitigate god's evil deeds.

Other examples people bring up are that if a kid is sick, he may have to go through painful surgery to get better, and therefore inflicting that surgery isn't evil. That's only valid if we don't know of any other way of making that kid better other than the painful surgery. But now imagine if the doctor had anesthetic but decided to operate the kid live. He's curing the kid, but the suffering isn't necessary any more, just cruel. The end doesn't justify the means any more. God is omnipotent therefore he can get whatever good outcome he wants without suffering. Every suffering god inflicts is by definition unnecessary because he's omnipotent.

So the answer to your question is that IMO we can ascribe moral character to both people and god, but that the mitigating circumstances that apply to people cannot apply to god.

Ahh yeah I think I see now, thanks.

Just to reaffirm though:
People having limited power and limited knowledge means that the result of their actions does not always have to be a definite effect of their intentions. Because the result of their actions cannot be said to always be a definite effect of their intentions, then it is the case that peoples intentions can be used to determine the extent of whether the result of their actions are evil or not.

God having unlimited power and unlimited knowledge means that the result of his actions must always have to be a definite effect of his intentions. Because the result of his actions can be said to always be a definite result of his intentions, then it is the case that gods intentions cannot be used to determine the extent of whether the result of his actions are evil or not.

Would this be accurate in your view?

[sy2502]

Ahh yeah I think I see now, thanks.

Just to reaffirm though:
People having limited power and limited knowledge means that the result of their actions does not always have to be a definite effect of their intentions. Because the result of their actions cannot be said to always be a definite effect of their intentions, then it is the case that peoples intentions can be used to determine the extent of whether the result of their actions are evil or not.

God having unlimited power and unlimited knowledge means that the result of his actions must always have to be a definite effect of his intentions. Because the result of his actions can be said to always be a definite result of his intentions, then it is the case that gods intentions cannot be used to determine the extent of whether the result of his actions are evil or not.

Would this be accurate in your view?

perfect!

[GreatOldOne]

It doesn't disprove anything. At best it makes an argument (not proof, argument) for either the non existence or immorality of God, but no more than that.

is disproves a certain idea of god, in as much meaning as an argument can 'disprove' something and that certain idea has meaning. and it does that quite well.

but it does not speak to the existence of a supernatural being.

[Myriad88]

is disproves a certain idea of god, in as much meaning as an argument can 'disprove' something and that certain idea has meaning. and it does that quite well.

but it does not speak to the existence of a supernatural being.

Wre you even paying attention to the OP? The OP demonstrates that binary logic cannot substantiate a problem of evil argument i.e Evil existing cannot, by itself, disprove a moral God because it employs faulty logic. The scenario is not amenable to binary logic by virtue of the fact a logically possible third alternative is introduced. If it is logically possible that in the original argument "a moral God exists" and " evil exists" can both be true, the argument completely collapses.

to further clarify, here are some examples of binary logic arguments employing the law of non-contradiction whereby demonstrating the truth of one automatically falsifies the other due to complete occupation of the logical space between them.

It is true that J is a male

Therefore it is false that J is a female.

It is true that it is currently daytime.

Therefore it is false that is currently nighttime.

It is true that I exist.

Therefore it is false that I do not exist.

See the pattern/logic? In each argument a third alternative which would potentiate both statements being true or false at the same time is impossible. Thats the nature of the logic-I cant even introduce a logically possible third alternative without talking nonsense. For the problem of evil, that is not so.


Now if you would like to contest the veracity of "God has a morally sufficient reason to allow evil", go right ahead......but this is another argument entirely.