As a libertarian, should there be laws animal cruelty?

[ZenBowman]

It's true. Animals have no natural rights and it tarnishes the concept of natural rights to say they do, because it's a completely emotionally-based argument, not a rational one.

And humans having natural rights is rational how?

[B.O.L.A.]

And if this logical inspection of your nature leads you to think it his humane to torture animals, and they have no natural rights, then your logical inspection has been compromised.

When has man's nature driven him to torture animals? Just because it happens doesn't mean it is in our nature. You are using "humane" as a code word for "morality."

A humane society has humane laws. Does this involve the navigation of human emotion? I sure hope so. Because it is our emotions that make us human.

Animals have emotions. You don't think a dog gets happy to see its owner? Crows and ravens mourn when one of them dies. Animals definitely have emotions. That's not what makes them different from humans, not even close.

Think about this a little more...

[B.O.L.A.]

And humans having natural rights is rational how?

NATURAL LAW AND REASON

Among intellectuals who consider themselves themselves "scientific," the phrase "the nature of man” apt to have the effect of a red flag on a bull. "Man has no nature!" is the modern rallying cry; and typical of the sentiment of political philosophers today was the assertion of a distinguished political theorist some years ago before a meeting of the American Political Science Association that "man's nature" is a purely theological concept that must be dismissed from any scientific discussion.[1]

In the controversy over man's nature, and over the broader and more controversial concept of "natural law," both sides have repeatedly proclaimed that natural law and theology are inextricably intertwined. As a result, many champions of natural law, in scientific or philosophic circles, have gravely weakened their case by implying that rational, philosophical methods alone cannot establish such law: that theological faith is necessary to maintain the concept. On the other hand, the opponents of natural law have gleefully agreed; since faith in the supernatural is deemed necessary to belief in natural law, the latter concept must be tossed out of scientific, secular discourse, and be consigned to the arcane sphere of the divine studies. In consequence, the idea of a natural law founded on reason and rational inquiry has been virtually lost.[2]

The believer in a rationally established natural law must, then, face the hostility of both camps: the one group sensing in this position an antagonism toward religion; and the other group suspecting that God and mysticism are being slipped in by the back door. To the first group, it must be said that they are reflecting an extreme Augustinian position which held that faith rather than reason was the only legitimate tool for investigating man's nature and man's proper ends. In short, in this fideist tradition, theology had completely displaced philosophy. [3] The Thomist tradition, on the contrary, was precisely the opposite: vindicating the independence of philosophy from theology and proclaiming the ability of man's reason to understand and arrive at the laws, physical and ethical, of the natural order. If belief in a systematic order of natural laws open to discovery by man's reason is per se anti-religious, then anti-religious also were St. Thomas and the later Scholastics, as well as the devout Protestant jurist Hugo Grotius. The statement that there is an order of natural law, in short, leaves open the problem of whether or not God has created that order; and the assertion of the viability of man's reason to discover the natural order leaves open the question of whether or not that reason was given to man by God. The assertion of an order of natural laws discoverable by reason is, by itself, neither pro- nor anti-religious.[4]

Because this position is startling to most people today let us investigate this Thomistic position a little further. The statement of absolute independence of natural law from the question of the existence of God was implicit rather than flatly asserted in St. Thomas himself; but like so many implications of Thomism, it was brought forth by Suarez and the other brilliant Spanish Scholastics of the late sixteenth century. The Jesuit Suarez pointed out that many Scholastics had taken the position that the natural law of ethics, the law of what is good and bad for man, does not depend upon God's will. Indeed, some of the Scholastics had gone so far as to say that:

even though God did not exist, or did not make use of His reason, or did not judge rightly of things, if there is in man such a dictate of right reason to guide him, it would have had the same nature of law as it now has.[5]

Or, as a modem Thomist philosopher declares:

If the word "natural” means anything at all, it refers to the nature of a man, and when used with "law," "natural" must refer to an ordering that is manifested in the inclinations of a man's nature and to nothing else. Hence, taken in itself, there is nothing religious or theological in the "Natural Law" of Aquinas.[6]

Dutch Protestant jurist Hugo Grotius declared, in his De Iure Belli ac Pacis (1625):

What we have been saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God.

And again:

Measureless as is the power of God, nevertheless it can be said that there are certain things over which that power does not extend. . . . Just as even God cannot cause that two times two should not make four, so He cannot cause that which is intrinsically evil be not evil.[7]

D'Entr�ves concludes that:

[Grotius’s] definition of natural law has nothing revolutionary. When he maintains that natural law is that body of rules which Man is able to discover by the use of his reason, he does nothing but restate the Scholastic notion of a rational foundation of ethics. Indeed, his aim is rather to restore that notion which had been shaken by the extreme Augustinianism of certain Protestant currents of thought. When he declares that these rules are valid in themselves, independently of the fact that God willed them, he repeats an assertion which had already been made by some of the schoolmen.[8]

Grotius's aim, d'Entr�ves adds, "was to construct a system of laws which would carry conviction in an age in which theological controversy was gradually losing the power to do so." Grotius and his juristic successors—Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel—proceeded to elaborate this independent body of natural laws in a purely secular context, in accordance with their own particular interests, which were not, in contrast to the Schoolmen, primarily theological.[9] Indeed, even the eighteenth-century rationalists, in many ways dedicated enemies of the Scholastics, were profoundly influenced in their very rationalism by the Scholastic tradition.[10]

Thus, let there be no mistake: in the Thomistic tradition, natural law is ethical as well as physical law; and the instrument by which man apprehends such law is his reason-not faith, or intuition, or grace, revelation, or anything else.[11] In the contemporary atmosphere of sharp dichotomy between natural law and reason—and especially amid the irrationalist sentiments of "conservative" thought—this cannot be underscored too often. Hence, St. Thomas Aquinas, in the words of the eminent historian of philosophy Father Copleston, "emphasized the place and function of reason in moral conduct. He [Aquinas] shared with Aristotle the view that it is the possession of reason which distinguished man from the animals" and which "enables him to act deliberately in view of the consciously apprehended end and raises him above the level of purely instinctive behavior."[12]

Aquinas, then, realized that men always act purposively, but also went beyond this to argue that ends can also be apprehended by reason as either objectively good or bad for man. For Aquinas, then, in the words of Copleston, "there is therefore room for the concept of 'right reason,' reason directing man's acts to the attainment of the objective good for man." Moral conduct is therefore conduct in accord with right reason: "If it is said that moral conduct is rational conduct, what is meant is that it is conduct in accordance with right reason, reason apprehending the objective good for man and dictating the means to its attainment."[13]

In natural-law philosophy, then, reason is not bound, as it is in modern post-Humean philosophy, to be a mere slave to the passions, confined to cranking out the discovery of the means to arbitrarily chosen ends. For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason; and "right reason” dictates to man his proper ends as well as the means for their attainment. For the Thomist or natural-law theorist, the general law of morality for man is a special case of the system of natural law governing all entities of the world, each with its own nature and its own ends. "For him the moral law . . . is a special case of the general principles that all finite things move toward their ends by the development of their potentialities."[14] And here we come to a vital difference between inanimate or even non-human living creatures, and man himself; for the former are compelled to proceed in accordance with the ends dictated by their natures, whereas man, "the rational animal," possesses reason to discover such ends and the free will to choose.[15]

Which doctrine, natural law or those of its critics, is to be considered truly rational was answered incisively by the late Leo Straus, in the course of a penetrating critique of the value-relativism in political theory of Professor Arnold Brecht. For, in contrast to natural law,

positivistic social science . . . is characterized by the abandonment of reason or the flight from reason. . .

.

According to the positivistic interpretation of relativism which prevails in present-day social science . . . reason can tell us which means are conducive to which ends; it cannot tell us which attainable ends are to be preferred to other attainable ends. Reason cannot tell us that we ought to choose attainable ends; if someone 'loves him who desires the impossible,' reason may tell him that he acts irrationally, but it cannot tell him that he ought to act rationally, or that acting irrationally is acting badly or basely. If rational conduct consists in choosing the right means for the right end, relativism teaches in effect that rational conduct is impossible.[16]

Finally, the unique place of reason in natural-law philosophy has been affirmed by the modern Thomistic philosopher, the late Father John Toohey. Toohey defined sound philosophy as follows: "Philosophy, in the sense in which the word is used when scholasticism is contrasted with other philosophies, is an attempt on the part of man's unaided reason to give a fundamental explanation of the nature of things."[17]


NATURAL LAW AS "SCIENCE"

It is indeed puzzling that so many modern philosophers should sniff at the very term “nature” as an injection of mysticism and the supernatural. An apple, let fall, will drop to the ground; this we all observe and acknowledge to be in the nature of the apple (as well as the world in general). Two atoms of hydrogen combined with one of oxygen will yield one molecule of water—behavior that is uniquely in the nature of hydrogen, oxygen, and water. There is nothing arcane or mystical about such observations. Why then cavil at the concept of “nature”? The world, in fact, consists of a myriad number of observable things, or entities. This is surely an observable fact. Since the world does not consist of one homogenous thing or entity alone, it follows that each one of these different things possesses differing attributes, otherwise they would all be the same thing. But if A, B, C, etc., have different attributes, it follows immediately that they have different natures.[1][2] It also follows that when these various things meet and interact, a specifically delimitable and definable result will occur. In short, specific, delimitable causes will have specific, delimitable effects.[3] The observable behavior of each of these entities is the law of their natures, and this law includes what happens as a result of the interactions. The complex that we may build up of these laws may be termed the structure of natural law. What is “mystical” about that?[4]

[B.O.L.A.]

and....

A CRUSOE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

ONE OF THE MOST commonly derided constructions of classical economic theory is �Crusoe Economics,� the analysis of an isolated man face-to-face with nature. And yet, this seemingly �unrealistic� model, as I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere, has highly important and even indispensable uses.[1] It serves to isolate man as against nature, thus gaining clarity by abstracting at the beginning from interpersonal relations. Later on, this man/nature analysis can be extended and applied to the �real world.� The bringing in of �Friday� or of one or more other persons, after analysis of strictly Robinsonian isolation, then serves to show how the addition of other persons affects the discussion. These conclusions can then also be applied to the contemporary world. Thus, the abstraction of analyzing a few persons interacting on an island enables a dear perception of the basic truths of interpersonal relations, truths which remain obscure if we insist on looking first at the contemporary world only whole and of a piece.

If Crusoe economics can and does supply the indispensable groundwork for the entire structure of economics and praxeology�the broad, formal analysis of human action�a similar procedure should be able to do the same thing for social philosophy, for the analysis of the fundamental truths of the nature of man vis-�-vis the nature of the world into which he is born, as well as the world of other men. Specifically, it can aid greatly in solving such problems of political philosophy as the nature and role of liberty property, and violence.[2]

Let us consider Crusoe, who has landed on his island, and, to simplify matters, has contracted amnesia. What inescapable facts does Crusoe confront? He finds, for one thing, himself, with the primordial fact of his own consciousness and his own body. He finds, second, the natural world around him, the nature-given habitat and resources which economists sum up in the term �land.�[3] He finds also that, in seeming contrast with animals, he does not possess any innate instinctual knowledge impelling him into the proper paths for the satisfaction of his needs and desires.....

[Aside: Why is this? Why does man, compared to other animals, have so few "instincts" and why does he depend on reason for learning? It goes back to bipedalism and brain development. 3-5 million years ago human predecessor primates, for whatever reasons, descended from trees and began walking upright (thought to be in order to see approaching predators above grassy plains). This freed up their hands and thumbs for the manipulation of tools, (spears, fish hooks, knives) which greatly enhanced man's ability to survive and thereby strongly promoted cognitive centers in the brain as beneficial evolutionary traits, and human brain development accelerated rapidly. For the first time, more than any other animal, cognitive development was an extremely powerful predictor of survival. Various other mutations anatomically allowed brain growth to exceed that of other primates (notice that humans have much weaker jaw muscles compared to other primates). So humans began developing these abnormally large brains, which created problems with child bearing, because brain growth had evolved so suddenly that it out-paced pelvis width- the babies could not be born except very early in development. (and if you've ever seen a human birth, you know how insane it is getting the head out) And so most human brain development occurred outside the womb. No other animals are as helpless as humans for so long after their birth. Humans are by far the most nurturing and involved parents for offspring of any animal ever known. In fact, we even developed formal education, to cooperate in teaching OTHER children. No other organiism puts such an emphasis on education. So humans, by their evolved nature, therefore have become dependent on education and interaction and rationality in order to sustain their lives. OK, on with the borophyll...]

....In fact, he begins his life in this world by knowing literally nothing; all knowledge must be learned by him. He comes to learn that he has numerous ends, purposes which he desires to achieve, many of which he must achieve to sustain his life: food, shelter, clothing, etc. After the basic needs are satisfied, he finds more �advanced� wants for which to aim. To satisfy any or all of these wants which he evaluates in accordance with their respective importance to him, Crusoe must also learn how to achieve them; he must, in short, acquire �technological knowledge,� or �recipes.�

Crusoe, then, has manifold wants which he tries to satisfy, ends that he strives to attain. Some of these ends may be attained with minimal effort on his part; if the island is so structured, he may be able to pick edible berries off nearby bushes. In such cases, his �consumption� of a good or service may be obtained quickly and almost instantaneously. But for almost all of his wants, Crusoe finds that the natural world about him does not satisfy them immediately and instantaneously; he is not, in short, in a Garden of Eden. To achieve his ends, he must, as quickly and productively as he can, take the nature-given resources and transform them into useful objects, shapes, and places most useful to him�so that he can satisfy his wants.

In short, he must (a) choose his goals; (b) learn how to achieve them by using nature-given resources; and then (c) exert his labor energy to transform these resources into more useful shapes and places: i.e., into �capital goods,� and finally into �consumer goods� that he can directly consume. Thus, Crusoe may build himself, out of the given natural raw materials, an axe (capital good) with which to chop down trees, in order to construct a cabin (consumer good). Or he may build a net (capital good) with which to catch fish (consumer good). In each case, he employs his learned technological knowledge to exert his labor effort in transforming land into capital goods and eventually into consumer goods. This process of transformation of land resources constitutes his �production.� In short, Crusoe must produce before he can consume, and so that he may consume. And by this process of production, of transformation, man shapes and alters his nature-given environment to his own ends, instead of, animal-like, being simply determined by that environment.

And so man, not having innate, instinctive, automatically acquired knowledge of his proper ends, or of the means by which they can be achieved, must learn them, and to learn them he must exercise his powers of observation, abstraction, thought: in short, his reason. Reason is man�s instrument of knowledge and of his very survival; the use and of his mind, the acquisition of knowledge about what is best for him and how he can achieve it, is the uniquely human method of existence and of achievement. And this is uniquely man�s nature; man, as Aristotle pointed out, is the rational animal, or to be more precise, the rational being. Through his reason, the individual man observes both the facts and ways of the external world, and the facts of his own consciousness, including his emotions: in short, he employs both extraspection and introspection.

Crusoe, we have said, learns about his ends and about how to attain them. But what specifically does his learning faculty, his reason, do in the process of obtaining such knowledge? It learns about the way things work in the world, i.e., the natures of the various specific entities and classes of entities that the man finds in existence; in short, he learns the natural laws of the way things behave in the world. He learns that an arrow shot from a bow can bring down a deer, and that a net can catch an abundance of fish. Further, he learns about his own nature, about the sort of events and actions that will make him happy or unhappy; in short, he learns about the ends he needs to achieve and those he should seek to avoid.

This process, this method necessary to man�s survival and prosperity upon the earth, has often been derided as unduly or exclusively �materialistic.� But it should be clear that what has happened in this activity proper to man�s nature is a fusion of �spirit� and matter; man�s mind, using the ideas it has learned, directs his energy in transforming and reshaping matter into ways to sustain and advance his wants and his life. Behind every �produced� good, behind every man-made transformation of natural resources, is an idea directing the effort, a manifestation of man�s spirit.

The individual man, in introspecting the fact of his own consciousness, also discovers the primordial natural fact of his freedom: his freedom to choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason about any given subject. In short, the natural fact of his �free will.� He also discovers the natural fact of his mind�s command over his body and its actions: that is, of his natural ownership over his self.

Crusoe, then, owns his body; his mind is free to adopt whatever ends it wishes, and to exercise his reason in order to discover what ends he should choose, and to learn the recipes for employing the means at hand to attain them. Indeed, the very fact that the knowledge needed for man�s survival and progress is not innately given to him or determined by external events, the very fact that he must use his mind to learn this knowledge, demonstrates that he is by nature free to employ or not to employ that reason�i.e., that he has free will.[4] Surely, there is nothing outr� or mystical about the fact that men differ from stones, plants, or even animals, and that the above are crucial differences between them. The critical and unique facts about man and the ways in which he must live to survive�his consciousness, his free will and free choice, his faculty of reason, his necessity for learning the natural laws of the external world and of himself, his self-ownership, his need to �produce� by transforming nature-given matter into consumable forms�all these are wrapped up in what man�s nature is, and how man may survive and flourish. Suppose now that Crusoe is confronted with a choice of either picking berries or picking some mushrooms for food, and he decides upon the pleasantly tasting mushrooms, when suddenly a previously shipwrecked inhabitant, coming upon Crusoe, shouts: �Don�t do that! Those mushrooms are poisonous.� There is no mystery in Crusoe�s subsequent shift to berries. What has happened here? Both men have operated on an assumption so strong that it remained tacit, an assumption that poison is bad, bad for the health and even for the survival of the human organism�in short, bad for the continuation and the quality of a man�s life. In this implicit agreement on the value of life and health for the person, and on the evils of pain and death, the two men have clearly arrived at the basis of an ethic, grounded on reality and on the natural laws of the human organism.

[AKR]

1. Animals are not humans.

So? Humans are animals, so I guess I can be cruel to humans.


/end thread.

[IraHays]

So? Humans are animals, so I guess I can be cruel to humans.


/end thread.

pffft. Didn't you read the Great Wall of Text? It explains all!

[Kelei]

Humans have inherent value.

Some do, most do not.

[voltio8836]

So? Humans are animals, so I guess I can be cruel to humans.


/end thread.

For sake of thread topic and argument: no because you are moving up on the taxonomy tree whereas I am moving down.

[voltio8836]

I don't think Libertarians lump pets into the same property category as land.

so you agree that certain property should be subject to certain control by the government depending on what they are?

[IraHays]

so you agree that certain property should be subject to certain control by the government depending on what they are?

Not so much as what it is, but how the property owner is behaving. Torturing animals or destroying your land is not rational behavior.

If man is awarded his rights based on his ability to reason, then certainly irrational behavior should have consequences.

[voltio8836]

Not so much as what it is, but how the property owner is behaving. Torturing animals or destroying your land is not rational behavior.

If man is awarded his rights based on his ability to reason, then certainly irrational behavior should have consequences.

Yes but why does it matter to you what an owner is doing to his property as long as it does not harm u?

rofl sounds like you are proponent for big nanny government.

I knew it.

[ZenBowman]

...some emotional hand-waving about the nature of a man... Ctrl+C, Ctrl+V

Again, how is it rational to believe a man has natural rights? Just because a man has a nature, doesn't mean he has natural rights. Animals have a nature too, why are they exempt from their natural rights to freedom from enslavement?

The Crusoe example you gave was nonsense, man is endowed with plenty of instincts, just like animals, and an animal, when put in that survival situation, would react in a similar manner to Crusoe: explore his/her environment and learn about what to do and what to avoid.

[ZenBowman]

Um, because she is human.

Humans have inherent value.

Says who?

Entirely subjective, purely emotional argument under the shroud of rationality.

[IraHays]

Yes but why does it matter to you what an owner is doing to his property as long as it does not harm u?

What does it matter to you some guy you don't know murdered his wife?

rofl sounds like you are proponent for big nanny government.

I knew it.

lulz, this conversation went far. wtf??

[ZenBowman]

Let me respond with my own copy-paste:

Thomas Paine - Agrarian Justice
http://www.ssa.gov/history/paine4.html

To understand what the state of society ought to be, it is necessary to have some idea of the natural and primitive state of man; such as it is at this day among the Indians of North America. There is not, in that state, any of those spectacles of human misery which poverty and want present to our eyes in all the towns and streets in Europe.

Poverty, therefore, is a thing created by that which is called civilized life. It exists not in the natural state. On the other hand, the natural state is without those advantages which flow from agriculture, arts, science and manufactures.

The life of an Indian is a continual holiday, compared with the poor of Europe; and, on the other hand it appears to be abject when compared to the rich. Civilization, therefore, or that which is so-called, has operated two ways: to make one part of society more affluent, and the other more wretched, than would have been the lot of either in a natural state.

It is always possible to go from the natural to the civilized state, but it is never possible to go from the civilized to the natural state. The reason is that man in a natural state, subsisting by hunting, requires ten times the quantity of land to range over to procure himself sustenance, than would support him in a civilized state, where the earth is cultivated.

When, therefore, a country becomes populous by the additional aids of cultivation, art and science, there is a necessity of preserving things in that state; because without it there cannot be sustenance for more, perhaps, than a tenth part of its inhabitants. The thing, therefore, now to be done is to remedy the evils and preserve the benefits that have arisen to society by passing from the natural to that which is called the civilized state.

In taking the matter upon this ground, the first principle of civilization ought to have been, and ought still to be, that the condition of every person born into the world, after a state of civilization commences, ought not to be worse than if he had been born before that period.

But the fact is that the condition of millions, in every country in Europe, is far worse than if they had been born before civilization begin, had been born among the Indians of North America at the present. I will show how this fact has happened.

It is a position not to be controverted that the earth, in its natural, cultivated state was, and ever would have continued to be, the common property of the human race. In that state every man would have been born to property. He would have been a joint life proprietor with rest in the property of the soil, and in all its natural productions, vegetable and animal.

But the earth in its natural state, as before said, is capable of supporting but a small number of inhabitants compared with what it is capable of doing in a cultivated state. And as it is impossible to separate the improvement made by cultivation from the earth itself, upon which that improvement is made, the idea of landed property arose from that parable connection; but it is nevertheless true, that it is the value of the improvement, only, and not the earth itself, that is individual property.

Every proprietor, therefore, of cultivated lands, owes to the community a ground-rent (for I know of no better term to express the idea) for the land which he holds; and it is from this ground-rent that the fund proposed in this plan is to issue.

...

[reyalp]

I think that law should be abolished.

Why do dogs get a pass when bugs, cows, plants, ants, snakes do not?

What someone wants to do with their animal in the privacy of their own home should be respected.

WHO IS THE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE WHAT I CAN OR CAN'T DO TO AN ANT VS A DOG?

What is your rampant obsession with libertarians? Did a libertarian style on you in front of your girlfriend, take her by the arm and make sweet love to her in the back seat of your car?

[Jets96]

Um, because she is human.

Humans have inherent value. We have natural rights that come from logical inspection of our nature. By nature a human is rational and makes conscious decisions, and uses this to work, exchange labor and goods and socialize, in order to sustain his/her life.

So... do humans with development disabilities have inherent value? I'm talking about people who cannot make conscious decisions/use his or her work labour blah blah blah.

Could you not argue that ALL life has intrinsic value? Are dogs not the center of their lives just as we humans are?

What gives humans more of a right to live than a dog. We tend to base our decisions on a anthropocentric view and therefore always subjective.

Just throwing some crap out there

[Shaymin]

Yes but why does it matter to you what an owner is doing to his property as long as it does not harm u?

rofl sounds like you are proponent for big nanny government.

I knew it.

lmaaaaaaaaaaao x2

[fballer12]

I agree that humans should have the right to do what they will with animals....However, if somebody sees you or hears about you mistreating animals, they should also have the right to beat the **** out of and/or kill you

[AKR]

pffft. Didn't you read the Great Wall of Text? It explains all!

lol, f*ck that.

For sake of thread topic and argument: no because you are moving up on the taxonomy tree whereas I am moving down.

What's the point of your tree? Who cares? We're all animals. Either animals don't have rights or they do. You have no reason to say one animal has rights and others do not.

Yes but why does it matter to you what an owner is doing to his property as long as it does not harm u?

rofl sounds like you are proponent for big nanny government.

I knew it.

Why do you care if a parent is raping his child as long as it does not harm u?


rofl sounds like you are proponent for big nanny government.

I knew it.

Um, because she is human.

Humans have inherent value. We have natural rights that come from logical inspection of our nature. By nature a human is rational and makes conscious decisions, and uses this to work, exchange labor and goods and socialize, in order to sustain his/her life.

You're talking out of your ass. Not all humans fall into your definition and some other species do. You're also using some ridiculously subjective values. OMG, they exchange labor and goods, so they don't deserve to be tortured! WTF does the behavior of exchanging labor and goods have to do with anything? How is it relevant to what a being feels concerning torture?

[voltio8836]

wahhhh! I have no real argument to the OP so I am going to cry about how he constantly critiques r/p libertarian fallacies in hopes to hide my retardation!

sup.

[Queequeg]

I think that law should be abolished.

Why do dogs get a pass when bugs, cows, plants, ants, snakes do not?

What someone wants to do with their animal in the privacy of their own home should be respected.

WHO IS THE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE WHAT I CAN OR CAN'T DO TO AN ANT VS A DOG?

Why are property rights extended to humans but not animals?

[reyalp]

sup.

She was really good btw. Probably why you now opt for hookers.

[AKR]

bump

lol, f*ck that.





What's the point of your tree? Who cares? We're all animals. Either animals don't have rights or they do. You have no reason to say one animal has rights and others do not.






Why do you care if a parent is raping his child as long as it does not harm u?


rofl sounds like you are proponent for big nanny government.

I knew it.







You're talking out of your ass. Not all humans fall into your definition and some other species do. You're also using some ridiculously subjective values. OMG, they exchange labor and goods, so they don't deserve to be tortured! WTF does the behavior of exchanging labor and goods have to do with anything? How is it relevant to what a being feels concerning torture?